



## Public Key Crypto

So far, we've been thinking about crypto symmetrically...



With this method, we'd need keys for every possible link. In a class of 60 students,  $60^2$  keys would be required for all students to be able to communicate with one another.

Instead, we can use public keys to establish secret keys:



This is a "Digital Signature"


$$\sigma = \text{Sig}_{skA}(m)$$

$$\text{Accept if: } \text{Ver}_{pkA}(m, \sigma) = 1$$

- In this scenario, the secret key is held by the signer, and the public key is held by the verifier.
- Think of the public key as the "King's Stamp", which all members of the kingdom can recognize and verify comes from the king.
- Correctness:  $\text{Ver}_{pk}(m, \text{Sig}_{sk}(m)) = 1$


Review of MAC (Message Authentication Code):

$t = \text{MAC}_k(m)$     Accept if:  $\text{Ver}_k(m,t) = 1$




- MAC is secure if  $\forall \text{Adv}(\text{Pr}[\text{Adv Wins}] = \text{Pr}[\text{Ver}_k(m^*,t^*) = 1]) = 1/2^l$
- Lowercase  $l$  is the length of  $t$
- Cannot query  $m^*$

When using public and private keys, there is no verification oracle:



- $\forall \text{Adv}(\text{Pr}[\text{Ver}_{\text{pk}}(m^*, \sigma^*) = 1]) = 1/2^l$
- Lowercase L is the length of  $\sigma$
- Cannot query  $m^*$

Public Key Encryption:



$$\text{Enc}_{pkB}(m) = c$$


$$\text{Dec}_{skB}(c) = m$$

- This does NOT provide authenticity!

How do we get pk crypto?

One way is RSA function:

- Take 2 big primes, 2048 bits, p and q
- $N = p \cdot q = \text{RSA modulus}$
- e = RSA encryption exponent
- Take  $m^e \bmod N$
- For many years, e was always equal to 3



- m "sort of" equals the  $e^{\text{th}}$  root of y

If you know the decryption exponent "d", where  $d = e^{-1} \bmod \Phi(N)$ ,

where  $\Phi(N) = (p-1) \cdot (q-1)$ , you can take  $y^d \bmod N = m$ ,

with m s.t.  $y = m^e \bmod N$

## RSA Encryption:

The following is “textbook” RSA encryption...

$$pk_B = (e, N)$$

$$Enc_{pk_B}(m) = m^e \bmod N = y$$

$$Dec_{sk_B}(y) = m$$

The “real life” secure example looks more like this...

$$[PAD(m)]^e \bmod N$$


To generate RSA keys, choose random  $p$  and  $q$ , and find  $e$

Output:

- $pk = (N, e)$  where  $N = p * q$
- $sk = (N, d)$  or  $(p, q)$
- “RSA function implies factoring is hard”



This is easy!



This is hard!

RSAGen() = p, q, e

- p and q are 2048 bit primes

$d = e^{-1} \bmod (p-1)(q-1)$

- Keep secret:  $sk = (d, N, p, q)$
- Make public:  $pk = (e, N)$
- Decrypt:  $y^d \bmod N$                        $Dec_{sk}(y)$
- "Security of RSA rests on fresh moduluses"